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RECENT DECISIONS
the Court was of the opinion that it represented private property
and was outside the "realm of commerce" because "whether the
carrier would receive any part of it was a matter of speculation,
being wholly dependent upon the unrestricted will of its custodians"
-the reorganization managers.
The minority of the Court took the view that, in determining
whether the transaction pertained to commerce, the practical opera-
tion of the plan should control rather than the formal interests of
the respective parties. Applying this test to the contract governing
the fund created by the payment of $1.50 per share, the Commis-
sion was acting within its powers for, in substance, the payments
into this fund were part of the necessary price exacted for the new
securities. The dissenting opinion points out that reorganizations
of excessive cost militate against the stability of the credit of the
transportation system in that the attractiveness of railroad securities
as investments is impaired. Moreover, reorganization costs may
play a part in determining the going concern value of a railroad
company as an element of rate making 3 and, hence, the public at
large has a direct interest in the matter.
Stability of credit is essential to the preservation of the trans-
portation system to which end the Transportation Act, under which
the Commission derives its powers to regulate security issues, was
enacted.4 Regulation of fees and costs charged by bankers and
financiers who generally dominate reorganizations, should not be
permitted to be defeated by the simple expedient of having expenses
paid out by the managers for the account of the carrier rather than
payment being made directly by the carrier. The majority opinion
is not in harmony with the broad purpose of the legislative enactment.
E. P. W.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-JOINDER OF PARTIES DEFENDANT-
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, SEC. 193, SUBD. 2, CONsTRuED.-Plaintiff, an
employee of a car-cleaning company, was injured by shunting cars
belonging to the defendant railroad company but upon land leased
by it to the employer. Defendant now seeks to have the employing
company brought in as party defendant under a contract by which
said employer agrees to indemnify the railroad for all injuries to
person or property occurring upon land leased from the railroad.
The trial Court denied defendant's motion for joinder. On appeal,
Held, reversed. Hejza v. New York Central R. R. Co., 137 Misc.
824, 246 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1930).
'See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company, 272 U. S. 400, 414, 47
Sup. Ct. 140 (1926); United Railways v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct.
123 (1930).
'New England Divisions Case. 261 U. S. 184, 189, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1922);
Dayton, Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478, 44 Sup.
Ct. 169 (1923).
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The employer is here sought to be joined under section 193,
subdivision 2, of the New York Civil Practice Act.' But, it is
claimed, since the indemnity sought arises from a separate instru-
ment, outside the action, that the statute does not apply. This calls
for an interpretation of the phrase "for the claim made against such
party in the action." This legislative ambiguity, if strictly construed,
limits the application to parties liable upon the exact complaint in
the action 2 and the rule would be rendered nugatory. But following
a line of cases 3 which have given some breadth to the law the court
here broadly interprets the statute as applying to all claims related to
the same subject matter. This despite the fact that the third person's
liability to defendant is based on contract while the original action
was for negligence.4 Such a construction appears to carry out the
purpose of the legislature by accepting "common questions of law
or fact" as the basis for joinder 5 rather than the old outmoded re-
quirement of liability directly to the plaintiff, or failing that, to the
defendant for contribution or indemnity directly under the plaintiff's
claim.6
D. J. R.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT
MoToRT.-Defendant, a non-resident, while operating an automo-
bile within the state collided with the plaintiff. Process was served
in accordance with section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.1
Upon the receipt appears the name of another. Defendant did not
deny she received a copy of the summons by registered mail, nor
did she allege she did not sign the receipt either personally or by
her agent. Defendant appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction
of the Court on the sole ground that the return receipt was insuffi-
cient upon its face, Held, the statute as construed does not require
the return receipt to be signed personally by the defendant, and in
1N. Y. Laws, 1923, c. 250, where any party to an action shows that
some third person * * * is or will be liable to such party * * * for the claim
made against the party in the action, the Court, on application of such
party, may order such person to be brought in as a party to the action * *
22 Carmody's New York Practise (1930) 874.
'Travlos v. Commercial Union of America, 217 App. Div. 352, 217 N.
Y. Supp. 459 (lst Dept., 1926); Prescott v. Nye, 223 App. Div. 356, 228 N.
Y. Supp. 156 (3rd Dept., 1928; Wichert & Co. v. Gallagher & Asher, 201
N. Y. Supp. 186 (1923) ; Driscoll v. Corwin, 133 Misc. 788, 233 N. Y. Supp.
483 (1929).
'But cf. Krombach v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. Supp. 138
(2nd Dept., 1925).
'Rothschild, The Consolidated Action, (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 151.
167.
' May v. Mott Ave. Corp., 121 Misc. 398, 401, 201 N. Y. Supp. 189,
191 (1923).
'N. Y. Cons. Laws, Ch. 71.
